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LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AND ESTOPPEL BY CONTRACT.
N the last edition of SEDGWICK'S ELEMENTS OF THE LAW Ov, DAMAGES the author says (p. 232) that the.subject of liquidated dam-

ages has been put in a new light by the two cases of the Sun
Printing and Publishing Association v. Moore' and the Clydebank
R. &S. Co. v. Castaneda,2 and that they may be expected to have a
considerable effect upon the further development of the law on the
subject. The learned author then presents the old canons of interpretation with full illustration from the cases, followed by the citation of the decisions above mentioned, and concludes that in the light
of these cases the old technidal views of the canons of interpretation
can no longer be regarded as conclusive. An examination of some
of the cases recently decided may be helpful in deterrmiining the
meaning of these decisions.3
A few months before the decision in the Sun Assn. case (supra)
was handed down by the United States Supreme Court, a case on a
somewhat similar state of facts was decided in the Seventh Circuit
of the Circuit Court of Appeals.4 In this case the plaintiffs had executed a bond conditioned thaf it should be void-if the work of clearing off a lot preparatory to building should not be completed in accordance with -the contract by April I, 1897, but by which they.
bound themselves in the sum of $2o,ooo, "computed and agreed
upon by and between the United States of America and themselves
as liquidated damages and not as penalty, to be immediately due the
United States on the first day of April, 1897." The court held that
the loss from a slight delay in delivery of the lot ready for the new
building would be easily calculable and therefore the sum mentioned
in the bond was penalty. and not liquidated damages.' The court said
that in such cases "unless it is clear that * * * it would be difficult
or impossible to assess the actual damages from testimony" the court
must admit the testimony to prove a penalty. This statement is cited with disapproval by the United States Supreme Court in the case to
be considered next.
In the case of the Sun Printing and Pilblishing Ass'n v. Moore
(supra) a yacht was chartered by the newspaper company to gather
183 U.*S. 642.
2 [z9o5], A. C. 6.
1 The following from the State courts may be cited as suggestive: City of York v.
York.Rys. Co. (ipto), - Pa. -, 78 Atl. 128; Mosler Safe'Co. v. Maiaen Lane Deposit
Co. (igio), - N. Y. -, 93 N. E. 8x; Cleveland Crane & Car Co. v. American Cast
Iron Pipe Co. (igo), - Ala. -, 50 South 313.
4The Chicago Hobse-Wrecking Co. v. United States (igox), io6 Fed. 385.
5Cf. Kemble v. Farren, 6 Bing. 141.
1 (901),
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news of the Spanish-American War. Among other provisions' it
was agreed "that for the purpose of this charter the value, of the
yacht shall be considered and taken at the sum of $75,ooo." The
yacht was wrecked and became a total loss. The Supreme Court
quoted the Chicago House Wrecking case (supra) and the Gay
Mfg. Co. v. Camps as saying "'where actual damages can be assessed
* * * the court * * * must require proof of the damages." It said
this doctrine was wrong in principle and refused to consider evidence
that the loss was less than'the sum mentioned. Both these decisions
would seem to be right. The Supreme Court i§ right, too, in part
at least, in its disapproval of what it calls'the doctrine of the cases
in the lower federal courts, but that the supreme court does not
make plain just what its own doctrine is and why it differs from
the lower courts is evident enough from the use that has been made
of the decision subsequently by the courts and by commentators on
these cases. The distinction between the cases may be made by
invoking the principle of estoppel. In the Chicago House-Wrecking
case both parties were coisidering an undeterminable future event;
namely, the failure to finish a task on time, -and "there was nothing
in the situation to prohibit them from considering all the possibilities as to value of the breach, taking into account the agreement
itself, the sum mentioned in the bond, the subject matter of the
contract and the possible combination of events attending the breach,
if it occurred. Nor when the case came to trial was there anything to
prevent the court from admitting testimony in regard to any one of
these points. It may be noted here in passing that a-different interpretation might have been placed upon the situation after full consideration of evidence on all the above mefitioned points: Damages
for delay in the performance of a contract if reasonable, may be
stitulated.7 See also City of Ybrk v. York Rys. Co.,8 to be considered later. It seems though, as said above, that the decision was
light. Possibly if the sum mentioned had been something less than
$2o,ooo the conclusion might have been. different.
z In the Sun Ass'n case the situation of the parties making the
agreement is entirely different from what it was in the previous case.
The parties are not looking toward an undeterminable future event
but are attempting to arrive at a rough estimate of the value of an
undeterminable present fact-the yacht had no market value. They
agreed- upon the sum of $75,ooo a the value of the yacht and on
the strength of that agreement Moore parted with his property.
e 65 'Fed. 794, 68 Fed. 67.
7 Monmouth Park Assoc. v, Wallis Iron Works,
s (191o), - Pa. -,
78 Ati. z28 (supra).
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The Clydebank, etc., case (supra) is cited by SEDGWiCi along with
each illusanalogous,
the Sun Ass'n case as if the two cases were
a phrase
preascertainment,"
by
"liquidation
of
trating the new idea
mentioned
first
the
in
Robertson
Lord
of
utterance
the
from
adapted
case.10 "It Would seem possible to differentiate these two cases on
their respective facts. In the Clydebank, etc., case the appellants had
contracted with the Spanish government to build four torpedo boats,
to be delivered within varying periods. The contracts provided
that "the penalty for later 'delivery. shall be at the rate of £500
per week for each vessel." It is manifest, that w e have here the con-"
sideration by the parties of the value of an undeternninable future
event; namely, the loss resulting from a failuie to deliver. There
is no question raised as to the exclusion of evidence of acttial loss,
and considering the contract in all its relations when made it is decided to be one in which a fair sum is fixed as the value Of'an undeterminable future event, which can of course be liquidated under the
provisions of our old canon of criticism used for the decision in
Moninouth Park Ass'n v. Iron Works" (supri). The court, however, lays stress on the '"preascertainment" and ignores the conditions that make the preascertainment significant. It may be
noted here that the case upon which the opinion of Lord Davey
rests,11 in which responderits agreed to "pay the lessor £ioo per
acre for all lands not restored at a particular date," the facts are
on all'fours with those in the yach(case (supra) as the parties have
agreed as to a present! fact; namely, the value of the land in case it
is not redeliiered. The sum fixed, though called a penalty by the
parties, was held to be a liquidated sum by the court which gave "preascertainment" as the reason, though the ultimate reason back of the
preascertainment would seem to be the estoppel, as 1in2 the Sun Ass/n
case (supra). In a subsequent Privy Council case the "lpreascertainment" doctrine was called in to decide the question. A clause
fixing damages for non-completion of. a railway, was held to be a
penalty, as not being a preestimate of damages by agreement, but the
agreement here was to forfeit ten per cent. retention money in case
of delay in completion, nd this sum might have been very. large in
case of a slight dlay the value of which could be easily calculated,
bringing this case exactly in line with the Chicago House-Wrecking
ctse (supra).
In a later case 8 the. court approves the principle of Sun Assn. y

9 Op.'cit. P. 249.
10

See [go5l, A. C. p. x9.

'lElpnstone v. Monkland Iron & Coal Co. (r886), i x A. r. 332, 342 and 345.
commissioners of Public Works v. Hill [igo6], A. C. 368.
2 United States v. Bethe.iem Steel Co. (1907), 2o5 U. S. zot, 119.
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Moore (supra) and holds that a provision of $35 a day for slow
delivery of disappearing guns was liquidated damages although the
term 'liquidated" was not in the clause in question and the word
"penalty" was used repeatedly by both parties in the correspondence.
The court in this case gives some hint of what it means in talking of
the "principle" laid down in Sun Ass'n v. Moore by saying that formerly in all cases of doubt the tendency of the courts was to construe the provision as being a penalty whereas now the courts have
become "strongly inclined to allow the parties to make their own contracts." The facts in the Bethlehem case are exactly on all fours
with those in Clydebank Co. v Castaneda (sipra) the sum being fixed
in the American case for delay in furnishing disappearing guns instead of torpedo boats and in both instances the.war in which the
material contracted for was to be used came to an end before the time
fixed for delivery. In both cases the court gives as a reason for the
decision the "liquidation by preascertainment" The same distinction
on the facts can be made between this later U. S. Court case and
the earlier one, the Sun Ass'n case (supra) as 'vas made between
that later case and the English case. In the Bethlehem Steel Co. v.
U. S. there was an agreement as to the value of an undeterminable
future event, failure to deliver disappearing gun carriages. The court
said the principle decided in that case [-The 'Sun Ass'n v. Moore]
is "much like the contention of the government herein" but as has
been seen above in the examination of .the Clydebank etc. case, -the
facts of the two cases are so different that they can scarcely be included under the same principle.
Since the decision in -the Sun Ass'n case a number of cases have
been decided in the lower federal courts which have used the statement in the Sun Ass'n case as authority for denying the admission
of evidence -to prove penalty, btit each of the cases howed on its
face that-the actual damages were difficult of computation. Three
of these cases' 4 are agreements to pay a definite sum per diem for
delay in delivery. In all of them the Sun Ass'n case is quoted as a
controlling authority and as if the Supreme Court in that case had
laid down*a new canon of interpretation by its refusal to consider
evidence as to the intention of the parties to the agreement.
In several other Federal cases 5 there were agreements to pay a
lump sum in event of failure to furnish goods or perform service.
Each one is decided on 'the precedent of the Sun Ass'n case (supra)
14Wood v. Niagara Falls Co. (1903). zz Fed. 8z8; Stephens v. Essex Park Com.
(z9o6), 143 Fed. 844; Chapman Decorating Co. v. Mut. Ins. Co. (z9o6), 149 Fed. x8g.
5
2 Brooks v. City of Wichita (r902), 114 Fed. z97; United States v. Alcorn (19o6),
14S Fed. 995; Turner v. City of Fremont, x59 Fed. 221, again in x7o Fed. 26!; Blodget
-v. Live Stock Co., z64 Fed. 307.
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with some such statement as that in Brooks v. Wichita (supra), "the
case at bar falls directly within the doctrine of the supreme court"
in the Sun Ass'n case.Y6 All these cases are in their facts on a par
with the Bethlehem Steel Co. v U. S. and are decided on the same
principle, or rather by the same method; i. e., by considering the
contract, the sum mentioned and the subject matter of the contract,
and, with all these points before the court, determining whether the
agreement is one by which independently of the stipulation the damages would be uncertain, or incapable, or very difficult of ascertainment, in which case the damages may be liquidated ;17 of whether,*on.
the other hand, the sum agreed upon is one fixed as security for the
performance of a contract containing a number, of stipulations of
widely different importance, breaches of some of which are capable
of accuiate valuation according to the )rdinary legal standard, and
for any of which the stipulated sum is an excessive compensation, in
which case it would be considered a penalty.' 8
In the City of York v York's Rys. Co., (supra) a bond was given by the defendant "that the said bond (in the sum of. $25,000 )
shall be forfeited to and collectible by. the city 'as assessed and liquidated damages due and owing said city in the event of failure of the
company to complete and operate its line of railway within the time
stated." This was held to be liquidated damages. The defendant argued that this was a penalty under the canon which says that where
an'areement contains several matters of different degrees of importance and yet the -sum is payable fof the breach of any, even the least,
it is to be construed as a penalty. The court while not denying that
the principle contended for had been recognized by the Pennsylvania'
court said there was nothing-in it which forbade an express contractual stipulation that the whole sum named * * * shall be collectible
as liquidated damages * * * provided the contemplated breach is of
such a nature that the damages would be impossible or most difficult
to ascertain. The court thus acknowledges the validity of both canons
of interpretation but holds that the second applies and not the first.
21In the case of Brooks v. Wichita an agreement had been made by Brooks with
the city that in the event of his failure to furnish igo arc lights by April i, he was to
forfeit and pay to the city as liquidated damages and not as penalty the sum of $zo,ooo.
It might well have been argued in this case as it was in the Chicago House Wrecking
case that if the contract had been fulfilled by April s in every respect except some
small detail, it could hardly have been contemplated by the parties that the full amount
of $ro,ooo should have been exacted.
The case of United States v. Alcorn (supra) arose on a proposal bond for carrying
mail and although the actual damage had b.-en proved to be $336 and paid to the
Government, this did not prevent the United States from recovering the face of the
bond less this sum.
11 Cf. Strickland v. Williams [1899], 1 Q. B. 382.
11Cf. Kemble v. Farren, 6 Bing. 14.
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The facts here are almost identical with those in the Chicago HouseWrecking case (supra) in which the sum named was held to be penalty, the- court reaching this conclusion by holding that the first canon applied and not the second.

In the Cleveland Crane, etc., Co.

v. Am.Pipe Co. (supra) there was an agreement to pay $25 a day as
liquidated damages for failure to deliver cranes by a certain date.
The Alabama court held the agreement to be one for liquidated
damages in accordance with the canon of interpretation cited in the
York (Pa.) case, quoted above. The New York case of Mosler
Safe Co. v Maiden Lane Co. (supra) providing'for a specified sum
to be paid for each day's delay in completing the contract, was held
to be liquidated damages by reference to the same canon of interpretation.
These last three cases, recently decided by courts not immediately
under the influence of the United States Supreme Court, seem to
have been decided in ignorance of the decisions in the.United States
court or at least without any'appreciation of their bearing upon the
old canons of interpretatibn,, and they are all decided just as they
would have been if the new doctrine of liquidation by preascertainment had been applied to them.
We may perhaps conclude then that the new light thrown on the
subject of liquidated damages, by the two cases cited at the beginning of this article, show us that in case we have to determine the
meaning of an agreement in reference to the value of an undeterminable future event, the old canons may be used as of yore to aid in
the interpretation of the contract, recognizing 'that we may have
difficulty in each instance in determining whether our agreement
is one to do a single thing of an indeterminable value of: to do several things'one or more of which has an easily calculable value. In
all of these cases the fact that the sum has been predetermined by
the parties is not the significant element in the decisioi but the fact
that the agreement may be oihe or the other of those mentioned
above. The old canons of interpretation are appealed to for aid in
the actual determination of the question of penalty or liquidated
damages Whether we acknowledge the doctrine of "preascertain-nent,' or not, and no more since than before the decisions by the
United States Supreme Court and the House of Lords can the parties "preascertain" and fix upon what is actually a penalty under the
guise of liquidated damages.
*It is not to be concluded, however, that the Sun Ass'n case is not
of great importance in assisting in the determination of similar cases, but its importance does not depend upon the fact that it lays down
a new canon of interpretation nor abrogates any of the old ones.
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Nor does its importance consist in the fact that there was in it a
preascertainment of the sum by the agreement of the parties. It is
important'because such preagreement was in regard to a present
fact and as such gives us the necessary conditions of estoppel. This
can not be invoked in the other class of cases because they are all
-instances of agreement in regard to a future event, which is only a
rfiatter of opinion and not a statement of a present or past fact by
tl~e acknowledgment of which the other party has been persuaded to
change his position.
It is true, too, that the discussion of these cases by the supreine.
courts'has made evident a changed -tendency of the courts in handling such cases, a change' which is perhaps best expressed in the
language of Mr. Justice- Peckham in Bethlehem,Steel Co. v. U. S.1 1
"The courts at one time seemed to be quite strong in their views
and would scarcely admit that there ever was a valid contract providing for liquidated damages. Their tendencey was to construe -the
language as a penalty so that nothing but the actual damages sustained by the party aggrieved could be recovered.- Subsequently -the
courts have become more -olerant of such provisions, and have now
1
hecome strongly inclined to allow parties * * * to carry out their
own intentions * * * upon proof of the violation of the contract
and without proof of the damage actually sustained."
It is true that this pronouncement by the United' States Supreme
Co'urt of the tendency of the courts has been used by some of -the
lower Federal courts very much as though it were a binding rule
of interpretation, notably in Brooks v. City of Wichita,20 Turner v.
City of Fremont,21 United States v. Alcorn,22 although it actually
leaves us just where we were in. handling cases of' the type of
these last mentioned; namely, those in which the courts are dealing
with aft unvl'eterminable future event. :It is only when we have' before us the somewhat unusual state of facts presented in the Sun
Ass'n case,23 where 'the parties have agreed upon a present fact,
that'the peculiar doctrine of that case may be of assistance to us,
and this peculiar doctrine is after all nothing more than the' simple
principle of estoppel by contract.
JosEtp H. DRAIn.
UNMvRsITY oF MIcmoAMi
-1o20S U. S, 11g.
20114 Fed. 297.
2 iSg Fed. 221.,
'2145 Fed. 995.

n The only, other case in which a similar state of facts, appears is 4lpinstone
v. Monleand Iron & Coal Co. (z886), zz 'A. C. 332.

